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THE TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE AGREEMENT: A




Over the past twenty years, the world has witnessed technology 
advance at an exponential rate—undoubtedly altering the way that 
societies function internally and the manner in which they relate to 
others. And the age of innovation is just getting started. As one 
scholar predicts, “[i]n this and the next decade, we will begin to 
make energy and food abundant, inexpensively purify and sanitize 
water from any source, cure disease, and educate the world’s 
masses.”1 If that premonition is true, then one can only assume that 
globalization will continue to demand cooperation amongst the 
world’s masses, at least from those who want to survive, let alone 
thrive. However, because “the world’s masses” is a simple and tidied 
reference to what is actually a messy amalgam of different stake-
holders, certain fundamental tensions are inherent to participation in 
the international sphere.
In the context of multilateral trading, a historical tension exists 
between economically oriented, laissez-faire, pro-trade concerns 
and social, environmental, and health concerns.2 International trade 
scholar Sungjoon Cho eloquently describes this tension as an “inevi-
table phenomenon considering the multiplicity of values that individ-
uals, states, and institutions pursue.”3 On the one hand, “[p]eople 
1. Vivek Wadhwa, Why I Believe That This Will Be the Most Innovative Decade in 
History, FORBES (June 25, 2012, 7:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/singularity/2012/06/25/most-innovative-decade-in-history/.
2. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving 
Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2005) (describing the “glaring tension 
between free trade and social regulation”). 
3. Id. at 626. For a general discussion, see Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World 
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seem to desire free trade—or at least global free markets, driven by 
the principle of efficiency—that expands economic opportunity and 
promotes material welfare”; on the other hand, people simultaneous-
ly value the principle of regulatory autonomy, especially when it 
comes to bettering their “social hygiene in the areas of environmen-
tal quality and human safety.”4 But these conflicting values are inex-
tricable from one another in a world that encourages, and quite 
frankly mandates, a high level of economic interdependency. Thus, 
so long as innovators continue to innovate, as new products enter 
the market, and as new scientific information becomes available, 
tension between advocates of the free market and social regulators 
will persist.
But what if institutional actors could reconcile these conflicting 
values—at least toward the more efficient and practical goal of alle-
viating (rather than eliminating) the underlying tension? This Note
will argue that reconciliation is in fact possible5—and further, that 
significant steps are already being taken to produce the desired re-
sult. Part I of this Note discusses the historical tension between reg-
ulatory autonomy and free market values, as they surfaced during 
the evolution from the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Part II explores 
the practical implications of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agree-
ment (“TBT”) by examining a trio of recently decided TBT cases. 
Applying this jurisprudence to the currently pending dispute chal-
lenging Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act (“TPPA”), Part III 
predicts that Australia will be successful in defending its regulation, 
and argues that the outcomes of these TBT cases reflect a step 
toward practical reconciliation between market efficiency and regula-
tory autonomy.
Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753 (2002); Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten 
Linkages—Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and Analysis of the 
World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 461 (1998).
4. Cho, supra note 2, at 626.
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DISCUSSION
I. FREE TRADE VS. SELF-REGULATION: FUNDAMENTAL
TENSION FROM GATT TO WTO
GATT was established in 1947 as an indirect result of the war-
victors’ combined effort to create three institutions that would elimi-
nate the causes of war, also known as the “Bretton Woods Sys-
tem.”6 The Bretton Woods System proposed a tripartite scheme of 
international institutions: The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), 
The World Bank (“World Bank”), and the International Trade Organi-
zation (“ITO”). The IMF was designed to govern international mone-
tary and financial matters. The World Bank was established to 
provide a guiding forum for international development. And finally, 
the ITO was created to address broad international trade issues, 
including important social issues connected to but not directly within 
the scope of “trade” per se.7 While the first two institutions were suc-
cessfully materialized and remain important fixtures in the interna-
tional arena to this day, the ITO was stillborn. Given the broad 
spectrum of both trade and social issues that the ITO proposed to 
address, Congress feared that agreeing to the ITO would cede too 
much power to an international body. After failing to obtain congres-
sional approval, the ITO was reduced to GATT—one of the many 
chapters of the originally conceived ITO charter.8
From 1948 until 1993, GATT operated as a “club” pursuant to 
its Protocol of Provisional Application. Essentially, this clause al-
lowed members to “spur trade liberalization or contravene the rules 
of GATT when politically or economically necessary.”9 Thus, GATT 
was in no way a binding treaty. Moreover, GATT consisted of little 
more than a list of derogations and exemptions, primarily operating 
as a vehicle towards the freest of trade.10 However, GATT did in-
clude certain exemptions under Article XX, which clearly responded 
to numerous social concerns, including environmental protection 
6. Id. at 627.
7. Id. at 639–40.
8. Id. at 627.
9. Susan Aaronson, Historical Roots of GATT and the Failure of the ITO, ECON.
HISTORY ASS’N (Dec. 21, 2014), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/from-gatt-to-wto-the-evolution-of-
an-obscure-agency-to-one-perceived-as-obstructing-democracy-2/. 
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and human health.11 And while Article XX provided that those regu-
latory concerns might be sufficient, under certain circumstances, to 
justify “overrid[ing] the free trade obligations set forth in the other 
provisions,”12 GATT espoused an inherent pro-trade bias by labeling 
free trade concerns as “obligations” and social concerns as “exemp-
tions.”
To illustrate, consider GATT’s allocation of the burden of proof 
compared to that of a criminal proceeding in the United States. In 
the latter, the criminal is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, 
and the prosecution has the burden of proving otherwise. That is 
because the United States Constitution provides him with a right to 
liberty. And while the commission of a criminal act invokes an ex-
ception to his right to liberty (e.g., incarceration), the prosecution 
bears the burden of proof to show that the exception should apply. 
One can transpose this analysis to the GATT structure, where free 
trade is a right, and social concerns are the exception. While, in a 
criminal proceeding, the criminal prosecutor bears the burden of 
proof to show why incarceration applies as an exception to the right 
to liberty, the party invoking the exception (e.g., the regulation) un-
der GATT bears the burden of proof to show why that exception 
overrides the right to free trade.
Not surprisingly, this pro-trade bias did not sit well with envi-
ronmentalists and public health organizations.13 During the fifty 
years of growth in world trade under the GATT regime, the presump-
tion working against domestic regulators sparked fury in domestic 
policymakers, and in turn minimized their perception of GATT’s legit-
imacy.14 By the late 1980s, after several failed attempts to breathe 
life into GATT as a meaningful institution, a growing number of na-
tions felt that global trade expansion would be better served by a 
more formal international organization. Hence, in 1994, the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) was born as a product of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the “Uruguay Round”).15
While the WTO (World Trade Organization) is similar to GATT 
(General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade) in that both “have locat-
11. See General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
12. Cho, supra note 2, at 629. 
13. Id. (describing protestors depicting GATT and free tradists as “cold blooded monsters 
who cared little about legitimate environmental protests”). 
14. Id. at 651. 
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ed their primary institutional identity in the disposition of trade is-
sues,”16 the WTO has a much broader purview.17 Importantly, the 
Uruguay Round produced a new set of rules governing social issues 
that provides domestic policymakers, environmentalists, and public 
health advocates rights on which to stand: the Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Agreement (“SPS”)18 and the TBT.19 While this Note only 
addresses the practical implications of the latter agreement as it has 
recently been interpreted by the WTO Panel and Appellate Body, it 
is worthwhile to note that the SPS and the TBT complement one 
another in an effort to “strike[] a delicate balance between the policy 
goals of trade facilitation and national autonomy in technical regula-
tions.”20
II. TBT ARTICLE 2.2 AND A TRIO OF CASES
Juxtaposed to the content-oriented approach under GATT, the
SPS and TBT focus on process—or manner—oriented disciplines. 
That is, they are concerned with “how to regulate” rather than “what
to regulate.”21 This becomes extremely important when examined 
against the backdrop of the “world’s masses”: these are groups 
comprised of governments, public and private institutions, and indi-
viduals, separated by culture, development, religion, and politics, 
with such degrees of separation often resulting in a divergence in 
values among them. Under the old GATT, the content-oriented ap-
proach left ample room for the adjudicating body to negate the social 
values of the regulating state.22 By contrast, the TBT is structured to 
achieve two opposing goals simultaneously: ensuring trade liberali-
16. Cho, supra note 2, at 639–40.
17. See Aaronson, supra note 9 (noting that the WTO covers “subsidies, intellectual 
property, food safety and other policies that were once solely the subject of national govern-
ments”). 
18. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 493, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201867/v1867.pdf. 
19. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201868/v1868.pdf [hereinafter TBT]. 
20. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade Summary,
GLOB. TRADE NEGOTS.: CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. AT HARVARD UNIV.,
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/spstbt.html (last updated Apr. 2004).
21. Cho, supra note 2, at 665.
22. Id. at 651. The focus on the “content” of a given domestic measure left room for the 
reviewing panels to second-guess or negate the legitimate policy objectives and/or social 
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zation while allowing WTO members to adopt technical regulations 
to pursue their legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of 
human health or the environment. Thus, the structure of the TBT 
seeks to alleviate the historical tension between free trade and so-
cial regulation. TBT Article 2.2, specifically, is a tool of reconciliation 
between these competing values, as it limits the degree of trade-
restrictiveness to the extent necessary to fulfill legitimate objectives.
The scope of the application of the TBT includes every technical 
regulation pertaining to products. “Technical regulation” is defined in 
Annex 1.1 of the TBT as a “[d]ocument which lays down product 
characteristics or their related process and production meth-
ods . . .”23 The second sentence of Annex 1.1 of the TBT further 
states that a regulation that applies to a product is a “technical regu-
lation” if it addresses product characteristics.24 TBT Article 2.2 states 
as follows:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, 
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating un-
necessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, tech-
nical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the 
risks non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate objectives 
are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of 
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal 
or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, 
relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scien-
tific and technical information, related processing technology or in-
tended end-uses of products.25
Therein, the language of the provision requires that any chal-
lenge brought under Article 2.2 must undergo a two-step analysis. 
The adjudicating body must first determine whether the regulating 
country has a legitimate objective; second, it must decide whether 
the particular regulation is more trade-restrictive than necessary to 
fulfill that objective.26 Furthermore, the relevant case law mandates 
an additional consideration, which may or may not be organically 
23. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article 2.2, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 




26. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, ¶ 7.333, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/R (adopted Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter US Clove 
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addressed by the two-step analysis27: if the current regulation does
contribute to achieving a legitimate objective, does the complaining 
party provide sufficient evidence of a proposed alternative that is 
equally effective in furthering the goal? While Article 2.2 has been 
historically underexplored, the WTO’s Panel and Appellate Body has 
recently decided a trio of cases that, when taken together, provide 
clarity and guidance.28
A. US Tuna II: A “Dolphin-Safe” Tuna Labeling Scheme
The Appellate Body’s reasoning and ultimate decision in the 
case of United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Mar-
keting and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US Tuna II) indicates a 
willingness to take advantage of the room for regulation carved out 
by Article 2.2. In that case, Mexico challenged a labeling scheme 
enacted by the United States under its Dolphin Protection Consumer 
Information Act (“DPCIA”), claiming that it violated Articles 2.1 and 
2.2 of the TBT.29 The labeling scheme under DPCIA reflects a prom-
inent environmental concern and is designed to protect dolphins by 
providing information to consumers about how tuna was caught.30
Specifically, fisheries and retailers can only apply the “dolphin-safe” 
label if the tuna was caught using methods that do not include set-
ting on dolphins or driftnet fishing on the high seas.31 And while it is 
not obligatory for the importation or sale of tuna in the United States 
market32—in other words, retailers are still able to sell their tuna 
product in the market without a “dolphin-safe” label—the underlying 
idea is that consumers prefer to purchase a tuna product bearing a 
27. Appellate Body Report, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements, ¶ 461, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/R and WT/DS386/AB/R (adopted June 29, 
2012), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/384_386abr_e.pdf [hereinafter US COOL
Appellate Body Report].
28. See generally id.; US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26; Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products, ¶ 172, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/381abr_e.pdf [hereinafter US Tuna II Appellate 
Body Report].
29. US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 172.
30. Elizabeth Trujillo, The WTO Appellate Body Knocks Down U.S. “Dolphin Safe” Tuna 
Labels but Leaves a Crack for PPMs, 16 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 25 (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/25/wto-appellate-body-knocks-down-us-”dolphin-
safe”-tuna-labels-leaves.






      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 144 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
10 GAUL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2015 11:19 AM
274 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
“dolphin-safe” label. Thus, the DPCIA creates an impetus for fisher-
ies to catch tuna without posing a risk to dolphins.33
The Appellate Body found that the DPCIA violated Article 2.1 of 
the TBT, which prohibits “less favorable treatment,” because the 
measure modified the competitive condition of the market to the 
detriment of Mexican tuna products.34 Moreover, the DPCIA condi-
tioned eligibility for the “dolphin-safe” label upon documentary evi-
dence, depending on whether the tuna was harvested inside or 
outside of the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (the “ETP”).35 Where 
tuna was harvested inside the ETP, there was a difficult-to-satisfy 
evidentiary requirement; where tuna was caught outside the ETP, 
there was no evidentiary requirement.36 Thus, non-ETP tuna was 
automatically eligible for the dolphin-safe label, even if dolphins had 
in fact been seriously injured. Thus, while the DPCIA did not discrim-
inate against Mexico on its face, the measure did not apply even-
handedly: Mexican fisheries primarily harvest tuna inside the ETP 
and it would be “impossible” to overhaul the entire Mexican tuna 
industry to satisfy the DPCIA’s requirements.37
However, despite finding a violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT, 
the Appellate Body found that the measure was consistent with Arti-
cle 2.2. In other words, while the application of the measure was de 
facto discriminatory,38 the measure itself was not “more restrictive 
than necessary.”39
1. Legitimate Objective?
In US Tuna II, the Appellate Body defined “objective” as a “thing 
aimed at or sought; a target, a goal, an aim.”40 It defined the word 
“legitimate” as “lawful; justifiable; proper.”41 To determine the “objec-
tive” under Article 2.2 of the TBT, “a panel must assess what a 
33. Id. ¶ 29. The United States introduced evidence in support of the contention that, at 
the time the measure at issue was adopted, “there was strong consumer sentiment that set-
ting on dolphins to catch tuna was unacceptable and that something should be done to ensure 
that consumers had a choice not to purchase a product that contained tuna caught in associa-
tion with dolphins.” Id.
34. Id. ¶ 284.
35. Id. 
36. Id.
37. Id. ¶ 300. 
38. See id. ¶ 375. 
39. Id.
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Member seeks to achieve . . . [and] may take into account the texts 
of statutes, legislative history, and other evidence regarding the 
structure and operation of the measure.”42 In US Tuna II, the objec-
tive at issue was twofold: (1) to “ensur[e] that consumers are not 
misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna that 
was caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins”; and (2) to 
“contribut[e] to the protection of dolphins by ensuring that the [United 
States] market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna 
in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.”43 The lack of analysis 
suggests that the legitimate objective prong was not at issue in the 
US Tuna II case. Thus, there seems to be an underlying assumption 
that protecting the lives of dolphins, both directly and indirectly by 
providing accurate information to consumers, is a “target, [] goal, [or] 
aim” that is “lawful, justifiable, [and] proper.”44
2. More Trade Restrictive than Necessary to Achieve the Legit-
imate Objective?
In determining whether the regulation fulfills the legitimate ob-
jective, the Appellate Body reasoned that the degree of achievement 
of a particular objective may be discerned from the design, structure, 
and operation of the technical regulation, as well as from evidence 
relating to the application of the measure.45 Moreover, in analyzing 
the phrase “unnecessary obstacles to international trade” together 
with “not . . . more trade restrictive than necessary,” with the latter 
qualifying the former, the Appellate Body looked to the following 
factors:
(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure to the legiti-
mate objective at issue;
(ii)  the trade-restrictiveness of the measure; and
(iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of consequenc-
es that would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective(s) pursued 
by the Member through the measure.46
As the complainant bearing the burden of proof, Mexico sug-
gested that the United States could have adopted an alternative 
regulation that would have been less trade restrictive. Specifically, 
42. Id. ¶ 314. 
43. Id. ¶ 20. 
44. See id. ¶ 330 n.663. 
45. Id. ¶ 150. 
46. Id. ¶ 322. It is important to note that the complainant bears the burden of proof in 
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Mexico argued that the Agreement on the International Dolphin 
Conservation Program (“AIDCP”) label (which could be obtained 
despite setting on dolphins) and the US “dolphin-safe” label should 
be allowed to coexist in the United States market.47 Mexico argued 
that AIDCP’s “dolphin-safe” label would provide consumers with 
information about methods other than the strict no-setting measure 
used to protect dolphins.
In comparing the current measure with Mexico’s proposed al-
ternative, the Appellate Body partially combined its analysis as to 
the “degree of contribution made by the measure” as well as the 
“trade-restrictiveness” of the measure. Specifically, in contemplating 
the degree of contribution made by the United States’ measure to 
the legitimate objective at issue, the Appellate Body determined that 
the United States’ labeling scheme fulfills its objective to a greater 
degree than Mexico’s proposed alternative.48 Since, under the pro-
posed alternative measure, tuna caught in the ETP by setting on 
dolphins would be eligible for the AIDCP’s “dolphin-safe” label, it 
would contribute to the objective to a lesser degree than the current 
measure. Specifically, it has the potential to mislead consumers, and 
more importantly “it would allow more tuna harvested in conditions 
that adversely affect dolphins to be labeled ‘dolphin-safe.’”49 Thus, 
Mexico failed to show a less-restrictive alternative to the current 
measure that could successfully contribute to the legitimate objec-
tive of dolphin protection.
Ultimately, even though the Appellate Body found the measure 
inconsistent with Article 2.1, it found the labeling scheme consistent 
with Article 2.2.50 Thus, to comply with the ruling, the United States 
had to make the labeling requirements outside the ETP match the
more stringent requirements inside the ETP.51 Because the measure 
was found to be noncompliant with Article 2.1, it is clear that free 
trade is still a reckoning concern in the eyes of the WTO. However, 
the case illustrates that, by allocating the burden of proof onto the 
complaining party, TBT Article 2.2 procedurally aligns itself with the 
theory that a defending regulator is “innocent until proven guilty.”
47. Id. ¶ 59. 
48. Id. ¶ 330. 
49. Id.
50. Jonathan Carlone, Note, An Added Exception to the TBT Agreement After Clove, 
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B. US Clove Cigarettes: A Complete Ban
In 2009, President Obama signed the Family Smoking Preven-
tion and Tobacco Control Act (“FSPTCA”).52 The United States 
House Energy and Commerce Committee had proposed the 
FSPTCA with a goal towards reducing the number of young Ameri-
cans who begin smoking.53 The Act provided the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) with a new broad statutory authority to regu-
late tobacco products under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (“FDCA”).54 Section 101 of the FSPTCA adds chapter IX, sec-
tion 907(a)(1)(A) to the FDCA, banning the production and sale of 
cigarettes with certain characterizing flavors.55 Specifically, section 
907(a)(1)(A) of the FDCA (included via the FSPTCA) prohibits ciga-
rettes containing characterizing flavors “‘(other than tobacco or men-
thol) or [from containing an]  herb or spice.’” The flavors prohibited 
by section 907(a)(1)(A) include (but are not limited to), “strawberry, 
grape, orange, clove, cinnamon, pineapple, vanilla, coconut, lico-
rice, cocoa, chocolate, cherry, or coffee.”56
Indonesia, the largest exporter of clove cigarettes to the United 
States before the ban,57 challenged the FSPTCA claiming that it 
violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT. Menthol cigarettes are pri-
marily produced in the United States, whereas clove cigarettes are 
primarily produced in Indonesia.58 Thus, Indonesia argued that ban-
ning clove cigarettes while continuing to permit the sale of menthol 
cigarettes59 would discriminate against Indonesia in violation of Arti-
cle 2.1 of the TBT and GATT Article III: 4.60 The outcome was iden-
tical to that in US Tuna II, as the US Clove Cigarettes Appellate 
Body found the ban to be inconsistent with Article 2.1, but consistent 
52. Lucas Ballet, Comment, Losing Flavor: Indonesia’s WTO Complaint Against the U.S. 
Ban on Clove Cigarettes, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 515, 517 (2011).
53. Id. at 518.
54. Id. at 517.
55. Appellate Body Report, United States Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of 
Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 26, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter US 
Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report].
56. US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 2.4 (emphasis added).
57. Ballet, supra note 52, at 516–17. 
58. Carlone, supra note 50, at 109. 
59. Ballet, supra note 52, at 516–17. 
60. Tania Voon, Cigarettes and Public Heath at the WTO: The Appeals of the TBT Label-
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with Article 2.2.61 Because the United States only appealed the 
Panel’s decision in finding a violation of Article 2.1, the US Clove 
Cigarettes Appellate Body Report does not delve into the analysis 
conducted under Article 2.2. Therefore, the US Tuna II Panel’s dis-
cussion remains the guide for purposes of the Article 2.2 analysis.
Keeping in mind the fact that Indonesia had the burden of proof 
as the complaining party in US Clove Cigarettes, its claim was un-
successful with respect to Article 2.2 of the TBT for two main rea-
sons. First, the Panel stated that Indonesia failed to show that the 
ban on clove cigarettes did not contribute to the prevention of youth 
smoking.62 Second, Indonesia failed to show that an alternative, 
less-restrictive measure would contribute to the legitimate objective 
pursued by the United States.63
1. Legitimate Objective?
In US Tuna II, the Appellate Body defined “objective” as a “thing 
aimed at or sought; a target, a goal, an aim.”64 It defined the word 
“legitimate” as “lawful; justifiable; proper.”65 Just as the protection of 
dolphins satisfied this definition in US Tuna II, the protection of pub-
lic health by reducing youth smoking in US Clove Cigarettes was 
also considered a legitimate objective—that is, a target, goal, or aim 
that is lawful, justifiable, and proper.66
The parties in US Clove Cigarettes agreed that the public health 
objective of the clove cigarette ban was to reduce youth smoking. 
And while the objective of the FSPTCA, and of section 907(a)(1)(A) 
in particular, is not set forth in the FSPTCA itself, the Panel referred 
to the explanations provided by a House Energy and Commerce 
Committee Report, which stated:
Consistent with the overall intent of the bill to protect the public 
health, including by reducing the number of children and adoles-
cents who smoke cigarettes, section 907(a)(1) is intended to pro-
61. See US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.432; US Clove Cigarettes 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 55, ¶ 233.
62. Leonid Shmatenko, Regulatory Measures Through Plain Packaging of Tobacco 
Products in the Light of International Trade Agreements, 4 CZECH Y.B. INT’L L. 27, 38 (2013). 
63. Id.
64. US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 322.
65. Id.
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hibit the manufacture and sale of cigarettes with certain ‘charac-
terizing flavors’ that appeal to youth.67
With the Committee Report as its guide, the Panel rejected In-
donesia’s arguments that the true objective of the ban was not “legit-
imate” because it excluded menthol cigarettes as a result of a 
political compromise and out of concern for potential loss of U.S. 
jobs.68 The Panel stated that even if Indonesia’s assertions were 
true, it would not detract from the “legitimacy” of the objective.69
2. More Trade Restrictive than Necessary to Achieve the Legit-
imate Objective?
The Panel prefaced its second prong analysis by noting that 
“‘the level of protection’ sought is directly connected to the question 
of whether a measure is ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary.’”70
Indonesia argued that the ban on clove cigarettes was more restric-
tive than necessary because it greatly exceeded the level of protec-
tion sought by the United States. Specifically, because a large 
number of cigarettes purportedly smoked by youth were not banned 
by the FSPTCA, Indonesia argued that the level of protection sought 
by the regulation must be deterrence, not strict prohibition, of ado-
lescent tobacco consumption.71 The Panel flatly rejected this line of 
reasoning, stating that “[g]iven the U.S. Government’s long and frus-
trating experience in trying to limit youth smoking, the ‘high’ level of 
67. US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 2.6–¶ 2.7 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 
111-58, pt. 1, at 37 (2009)).
68. Id. ¶ 7.345. Indonesia called the ban a “‘disguised restriction’ on international trade 
and ‘a wolf disguised in the sheep’s clothing’ of public health.”
69. Id. ¶ 7.347–7.349. “It is self-evident that measures to reduce youth smoking are 
aimed [at] the protection of human health, and Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement explicitly 
mentions the ‘protection of human health’ as one of the ‘legitimate objectives’ covered by that 
provision.” In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body stated that “the objective pursued by the 
measure is the preservation of human life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of
the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The value pursued 
is both vital and important in the highest degree.’ In addition, we recall that in Brazil – Re-
treaded Tyres, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that ‘few interests are more vital and 
important than protecting human beings from health risks.’” Id. ¶ 7.347.
70. Id. ¶ 7.370. Both parties agreed with this assertion, which comes from the sixth 
recital to the preamble of the TBT Agreement, stating that “no country should be prevented 
from taking measures ‘necessary . . . for the protection of human . . . life or health . . . at the 
levels it considers appropriate.’” Id. Furthermore, the Panel noted previous explanations of-
fered by the Appellate Body: “in order to qualify as an alternative, a measure proposed by the 
complaining Member must be not only less trade restrictive than the measure at issue, but 
should also ‘preserve for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protec-
tion with respect to the objective pursued.’” Id.
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protection sought by the United States is evidenced by the measure 
applied—a complete ban.”72
Next, the Panel applied the following factors as established in 
US Tuna II:
(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure to the legiti-
mate objective at issue;
(ii) the trade-restrictiveness of the measure; and
(iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of consequenc-
es that would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective(s) . . .
Under the first factor of the “Necessary” test, the Panel exam-
ined whether banning clove cigarettes makes a material contribution 
to the objective of reducing youth smoking. Among the various ar-
guments set forth by Indonesia and rejected by the Panel was that 
prohibiting only a “tiny sliver” of the cigarettes smoked by youth 
could not make a material contribution to the public health objective 
of reducing youth smoking.73 This did nothing for Indonesia, as the 
argument seems to suggest that the measure is actually less trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill its objective.74 Furthermore, the 
extensive scientific evidence before the Panel provided overwhelm-
ing support for the ban and its ability to contribute to the objective of 
reducing youth smoking.75 It is particularly important to note that the 
72. Id. ¶ 7.372. (“The level at which the United States considers appropriate to protect 
public health is to eliminate from the market, not simply restrict access to, those products that 
are disproportionately used by young people.”).  
73. Id. ¶ 7.395.
74. Id. The Panel explained that this “would mean that, in order to make a material con-
tribution to the objective of reducing youth smoking, the United States would have to ban more 
types of cigarettes than it has.” Id. Thus, the Panel failed “to see how the ban on clove ciga-
rettes can be found to be ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary’ to fulfil [sic] its objective 
based on the conclusion that it is less trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil [sic] its objec-
tive.” Id.
75. Id. ¶ 7.401–¶ 7.415. “Some researchers have suggested that eugenol, which is 
present in substantial quantities in clove cigarette smoke . . . anesthetizes the backs of smok-
ers’ throats and tracheas, permitting deeper inhalation and possibly encouraging smoking in 
persons who might otherwise be dissuaded by the harshness of regular cigarettes.” Id. ¶7.402 
(citing CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EPIDEMIOLOGIC NOTES AND REPORTS 
ILLNESSES POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH SMOKING CLOVE CIGARETTES, 34 MMRW WEEKLY 21, 
297–99 (May 31, 1985), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000549.htm). “Clove 
cigarettes are sometimes referred to as ‘trainer cigarettes’ and may serve as ‘gateway’ prod-
ucts that introduce young people to smoking.” Id. ¶ 7.406 (citing Susan Farrer, Alternative 
Cigarettes May Deliver More Nicotine Than Conventional Cigarettes, 18 NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE NOTES 2 (Aug. 2003), 
http://archives.drugabuse.gov/NIDA_Notes/NNVol18N2/Alternative.html). “[F]lavoured ciga-
rettes can promote youth initiation and help young occasional smokers to become daily smok-
ers by reducing or masking the natural harshness and taste of tobacco smoke and increasing 
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Panel took into account certain guidelines set forth by the World 
Health Organization Framework on Tobacco Control (“WHO FCTC”) 
(recommending the regulation of flavored tobacco), as this could 
help to shape the direction of further decisions.76 Given the “genuine 
relationship of ends and means” between the objective pursued and 
the measure at issue, the Panel found that the ban on clove ciga-
rettes makes a material contribution to the objective of reducing 
youth smoking.77
Indonesia further argued that even if the ban materially contrib-
uted to the objective, there were less-restrictive alternatives availa-
ble that would make an equivalent contribution. The following is a 
non-exhaustive list of alternatives proposed by Indonesia: “restrict-
ing the sales of cigarettes to adult-only locations”; “limiting the dis-
play of tobacco products”; “placing strict requirements on 
packaging”; and “requiring health warnings.”78 While the Panel stat-
ed that “[i]t seems clear enough that each of these measures would 
be less trade-restrictive than the ban, . . . the mere listing of two 
dozen alternative measures without more does not show that such 
measures would make an equivalent contribution to the achieve-
ment of the objective . . . .”79 And finally, the Panel emphasized that 
even if the listing of such alternative measures could be found suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case, the United States successfully 
trumped such claims by showing that many of those alternative 
measures were already in place—and that those alternatives have 
failed.80
C. US COOL: Labeling Scheme for Imported Pork and Beef
For the third time in a row, in United States—Certain Country of 
Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements (US COOL), the Appellate 
rette Brands with Flavors that Appeal to Youth: Tobacco Marketing Strategies, 24 HEALTH AFF.
(2005). 
76. Id. ¶ 7.413 (citing World Health Organization, The Scientific Basis of Tobacco Prod-
uct Regulation, WHO TECH. REPORT SERIES 945 (2007). A study group of eleven experts 
established by the WHO FCTC noted that “[t]he recent production and promotion of flavored 
tobacco products is a major public health concern” as the “flavors could entice youth to exper-
iment with tobacco products.” Id. As such, the WHO FCTC study group recommends that 
“[r]egulations should be developed to prohibit manufacturing and marketing of candy-like and 
exotically flavoured tobacco products targeting young and novice smokers.” Id.
77. Id. ¶ 7.417.
78. Id. ¶ 7.422. 
79. Id. ¶ 7.423. 
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Body found a regulatory measure to be discriminatory in violation of 
Article 2.1, yet shied away from declaring the respective measures 
“more trade-restrictive than necessary,” thereby declaring the meas-
ure to be consistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT.81 First, a brief dis-
cussion of the facts and conclusion as to Article 2.1 is necessary to 
understand the analysis under Article 2.2.
Canada and Mexico (the complainants) alleged that the United 
States’ country of origin labeling (“COOL”) requirements for beef and 
pork violated, inter alia, Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT.82 The meas-
ure at issue in US COOL was the United States’ Agricultural Market-
ing Act of 1946, as amended by the 2008 Farm Bill and 
implemented through an Interim Final Rule of July 28, 2008, which 
imposed labeling requirements on beef and pork to be sold at retail 
that was produced from imported cattle and hogs.83 With respect to 
Article 2.1, the complainants successfully argued that the COOL 
measure was discriminatory because it accorded less favorable 
treatment to imported livestock than domestic livestock.84 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the Appellate Body focused on the de facto dis-
parate impacts of the COOL measure as it modified the conditions of 
the market to the detriment of the complainants—a comparable 
analysis to that applied in US Tuna II, discussed supra Part II(A).
Specifically, in order for retailers to have the information neces-
sary to comply with the COOL measure and to apply the appropriate 
label (out of the four options prescribed), the upstream meat pro-
ducers had to segregate livestock according to origin.85 This record-
keeping process was expensive, and imposed additional costs on 
producers and retailers alike. Consequently, the measure incentiv-
ized the United States’ beef and pork industries to rely exclusively 
on U.S. livestock, as they could then avoid the measure altogeth-
er.86 To that end, the COOL measure disadvantaged the complain-
ant exporters of cattle and hogs in violation of Article 2.1.
However, the next step of the TBT analysis in US COOL solidi-
fied a pattern that will be difficult to ignore with respect to future (and 
currently pending) TBT disputes: despite violating Article 2.1, the 
81. See US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶ 8.3.
82. Id.
83. Id. ¶ 7.7, 7.10.
84. Id. ¶ 348.
85. Id. ¶ 7.17.
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Appellate Body found that the measure itself was not “more trade-
restrictive than necessary” and thus did not violate Article 2.2.87
1. Legitimate Objective?
In this case, the Panel found, and the Appellate Body upheld, 
that the objective of the COOL measure was to provide consumers 
information about the origin of beef and pork products. As to the 
question of legitimacy, the Appellate Body critiqued certain aspects 
of the Panel’s analysis but ultimately upheld the Panel’s conclusion 
that the origin requirement was a legitimate objective. Notably, the 
Appellate Body’s affirmation was rooted in the burden of proof allo-
cation under TBT. Here, the complainants failed to show, through 
either arguments or evidence, that providing consumers with infor-
mation is not a legitimate objective.88
2. More Trade Restrictive than Necessary to Achieve the Legit-
imate Objective?
Under the “Necessary” prong of its analysis, the Appellate Body 
sought to review the same principal measures as it had in US Tuna 
II and US Clove Cigarettes: (i) the degree of the measure’s contribu-
tion to achieving the legitimate objective, (ii) the trade-restrictiveness 
of the measure, and (iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the grav-
ity of the consequences that would arise from non-fulfillment. It is 
important to note that the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s con-
clusion that the COOL measures violated Article 2.2, despite the fact 
that it could not complete the majority of the legal analysis for lack of 
sufficient evidence.89 First, the Appellate Body could not determine 
with any specificity the degree of the measure’s contribution. As to 
the second and third factors, the Appellate Body seemed to indicate 
that they would probably have failed the “Necessary” test had the 
Panel made clear and precise findings based on sufficient evi-
dence.90 Despite such an impression, the Appellate Body reversed 
the Panel’s finding that the COOL measures were inconsistent with 
Article 2.2 because the Panel had contrived and applied a “minimal 
threshold” analysis. In fact, the reversal was based solely on the 
87. US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶ 8.3.
88. Id. ¶ 453.
89. Id. ¶ 468.
90. Id. ¶ 479 (stating that the measure seemed to be of a “considerable degree of trade 
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Appellate Body’s determination that the COOL measures contribut-
ed, at least to some extent, to the legitimate objective of providing 
consumers with information.91
In a defining moment for TBT jurisprudence, the Appellate Body 
explained that there is no “minimum threshold of fulfillment” required 
to satisfy Article 2.2.92 In other words, instead of focusing on wheth-
er the particular measure fulfills the underlying objective completely, 
or meets some minimal level of fulfillment, the more appropriate 
question is whether the measure makes an actual contribution to the 
objective.93 To this extent, the Appellate Body seemed to suggest 
that this inquiry is qualitative, rather than quantitative. Here, even 
the most confusing labels under the COOL scheme provided more 
information than was previously available,94 and thus contributed to 
the legitimate objective of providing consumers with information 
about beef and pork products. This line of reasoning has important 
implications for future dispute adjudication. First, while the degree of 
a measure’s contribution to achieving its legitimate objective is a 
factor formally prescribed by the Appellate Body, in actuality, it is a 
question of whether the measure contributes to achieving the objec-
tive at all. The reasoning in US COOL seems to suggest that even 
where a particular measure’s contribution to achieving a legitimate 
objective is minimal, it is still better than nothing at all. However, 
where the complaining party argues that an alternative measure is 
less restrictive (as is basically required for any complaining party to 
succeed on an Article 2.2 challenge95), the degree of the current 
measure’s contribution becomes important to the extent that it can 
be compared to that of the proposed alternative.
Taken together, US Tuna II, US Clove Cigarette, and US COOL
reveal that TBT Article 2.2 allows for deference to the social con-
cerns of regulating states—a concept that was historically absent 
from dispute adjudication under the old GATT. One might perceive 
this trio of cases as espousing bias in favor of social regulation at 
the expense of trade liberalization, but this perception would be 
wrong. It is a delicate balancing act. However, it is true that the Ap-
91. Id. ¶ 7.352.
92. Id. ¶ 461. 
93. Id. ¶ 468.
94. Id. ¶ 476 (noting that the clearest label would indicate countries of birth, raising, and 
slaughter of livestock from which meat is derived, and the most confusing label would at least 
provide some information as to the origin).
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pellate Body seems unwilling to use Article 2.2 to strike down a 
regulation unless the complaining party can show that a less trade-
restrictive alternative would contribute to the achievement of the 
regulating state’s legitimate social concern. To understand that this 
is not bias, one could imagine a set of scales, with “social regulation” 
on the left scale and “free-trade” on the right, each weighing exactly 
the same. If the social regulation could be struck down entirely, re-
moving all weight from the left scale, the result would look like the 
unbalanced multilateral trading regime under the old GATT: unop-
posed, free-trade domination. However, TBT assumes that both 
scales should maintain some weight. For example, TBT 2.2 will only 
get rid of the current social regulation if there is another alternative 
to take its place—to preserve its weight. And in situations where the 
measure is found to be discriminatory under TBT 2.1, thereby offset-
ting the balance in favor of social regulation at the expense of free 
trade, the measure must be altered.96
III. AUSTRALIA’S TOBACCO PLAIN PACKAGING ACT
VIEWED IN LIGHT OF RECENT TBT JURISPRUDENCE
In 2011, Australia implemented what has been deemed “the 
world’s toughest law on cigarette promotion.”97 Despite the law’s 
reputation of stringency, this Note predicts that the law will be up-
held against attack under Article 2.2 as a transplant of the reasoning 
in the aforementioned TBT cases, which suggests that plain packag-
ing would not be more trade-restrictive than necessary.
In an effort to improve public health by “discouraging smoking,” 
and “encouraging cessation,”98 Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging 
Act (“TPPA”) prohibits tobacco companies from displaying their dis-
tinctive logos on cigarette packs.99 Since the TPPA’s enactment, 
Ukraine, Honduras, Cuba, Indonesia, and the Dominican Republic 
have commenced disputes in the WTO, and a record forty more 
countries seek to be joined in the dispute settlement process.100 In 
96. See, e.g., US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28. 




99. Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Austl.) ch 2 pt 2 div 1 para 20 [hereinafter 
TPPA]; see also Mcguirk, supra note 97.
100. World Trade Organization Panel to Hear Oral Arguments on Australia Tobacco Plain 
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addition to its proscription on trademarks, the TPPA further requires 
that tobacco product packages be “drab dark brown” in a matte fin-
ish, with no visible brand features other than the brand and variant 
name in a standard form and font below a mandatory graphic health 
warning.101 And finally, the TPPA prescribes a standardized shape 
for cigarette packs and cartons. Together, these regulations consti-
tute the measures at issue in the pending WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings.
In its complaint, Ukraine alleges, inter alia, that the TPPA vio-
lates certain provisions of the TBT Agreement. Following the Appel-
late Body’s interpretation of Annex 1.1, the plain packaging at issue 
in this dispute would be found to be a “product characteristic” that 
applies to an identifiable product: tobacco. Specifically, Ukraine ar-
gues that the TPPA violates Article 2.2 of the TBT because Austral-
ia’s “measures constitute an unnecessary obstacle to trade and are 
more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the stated health 
objectives.”102
1. Legitimate Objective?
The stated goals of the TPPA are as follows:
[T]o improve public health by: (i) discouraging people from taking 
up smoking or using tobacco products; and (ii, () encouraging 
people to give up smoking and to stop using tobacco products; 
and (iii, () discouraging people who have given up smok-
ing . . . from relapsing, and (iv) reducing people’s exposure to 
smoke from tobacco products.103
The legitimacy of this objective will likely not be disputed in the 
Australia TPPA case. First, the TBT explicitly includes the protection 
of public health as one of the legitimate objectives the agreement is 
intended to cover.104 To that end, a breadth of scientific knowledge 
makes the negative health impacts of tobacco consumption hard to 
ignore. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), tobacco-
related diseases are now “the single most important cause of pre-
http://www.ash.org.uk/media-room/press-releases/:world-trade-organization-panel-to-hear-
oral-arguments-on-australia-tobacco-plain-packaging-case-from-june-1-5-2015.
101. TPPA, supra note 99, at ch 2 pt 2 div 1 para 19(2)–(3).
102. Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging: Request for Consultations by Ukraine, 3, WTO Doc. WT/DS434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012). 
103. TPPA, supra note 99, at ch 1 pt 1 sub-para 3(1).
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ventable deaths in the world.”105 Attributing over twenty major cate-
gories of fatal and disabling diseases to tobacco consumption, the 
WHO predicts that tobacco will cause an estimated 100 million
deaths over the next twenty years.106 Currently, tobacco consump-
tion kills nearly 6 million people per year.107 “[A]pproximately one 
person dies every six seconds due to tobacco, accounting for one in 
ten adult deaths[,] [and] [u]p to half of current users will eventually 
die of a tobacco-related disease.”108 Unfortunately, Australian tobac-
co consumers are not immune to tobacco’s negative health im-
pacts.109
To be sure, the Appellate Body’s analysis in US Clove Ciga-
rettes indicates that reducing smoking is a legitimate public health 
objective. Yet unlike US Clove Cigarettes, where Indonesia argued, 
albeit unsuccessfully, that the exemption of menthol cigarettes was 
a disguised restriction on international trade and therefore negated 
the legitimacy of the stated objective, no such argument will be 
available in this case. Here, the TPPA’s plain packaging measures 
apply to “all tobacco products.” Moreover, the objective of the TPPA 
arguably falls squarely in line with the objectives of the labeling 
measure implemented in US COOL if interpreted as an effort to pre-
vent deceptive practices by providing consumers information about 
tobacco products.110
While Ukraine or other joining parties may make a creative ar-
gument as to why Australia’s objective to reduce smoking falls short 
of legitimacy, it is unlikely that this aspect of the analysis will garner 
much attention given the plain language of Article 2.2 and the Appel-
105. Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and Health: Glossary of Globalization, Trade and 
Health Terms: Tobacco, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story089/en/
(last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
106. See id. “Of the 100 million projected tobacco-related deaths over the next 20 years, 
about half will be of people in the productive ages of 35-69. In general, 9% of women in devel-
oping countries and about 22% in developed countries currently smoke. Without robust and 
sustained initiatives, these figures are expected to rise dramatically, with today’s 250 million 
women smokers rising to 340 million by 2020.” Id.
107. Media Centre – Tobacco Fact Sheet 339, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs339/en/ (last updated July 2015).
108. Id. 
109. Ukraine Launches WTO Challenge Against Australia Cigarette Packaging Law, INT’L
CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 16 BRIDGES (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/ukraine-launches-wto-challenge-against-
australia-cigarette-packaging-law (data provided by the Australian government shows that 
smoking has a high rate of mortality; “smoking kills 15,000 Australians annually”). 
110. This is comparable to the legitimate objective found in US COOL Appellate Body 
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late Body’s interpretation in US Clove Cigarettes. Instead, the major-
ity of the argument and analysis will likely take place under the 
“Necessary” test of the second prong.
2. More Trade Restrictive than Necessary to Achieve the Legit-
imate Objective?
In determining whether the TPPA is more restrictive than nec-
essary to achieve a legitimate objective, the panel will consider the 
following factors as established by the above-mentioned cases:
(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure to the legiti-
mate objective at issue;
(ii)the trade-restrictiveness of the measure; and
(iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of consequenc-
es that would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective(s).111
First, in determining the degree of contribution of the TPPA, it is 
significant to note that tobacco packaging is “one of the last remain-
ing forms of tobacco advertising in Australia . . .”112 Thus, there is a 
strong argument that the regulation of tobacco packaging will at 
least make some level of contribution towards reducing tobacco use. 
As the Appellate Body determined in US Clove Cigarettes, there is 
no minimal threshold a regulation must meet in order to satisfy the 
“contribution” prong of the analysis. The degree of the contribution 
becomes important only when analyzed in relation to the trade re-
strictiveness of the measure and when compared to any proposed 
alternative.
At the TBT Committee, Australia explained that the TPPA was 
based on “extensive research and evidence that carefully explored 
the impact of tobacco packaging.”113 For example, Australia intro-
duced evidence released by the Cancer Council of Australia 
(“CCAC”), reviewing “research over two decades across five coun-
tries from 24 published experimental studies.”114 The key findings 
from the CCAC report were as follows:
111. US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 322.
112. Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 15-16 June 2011, ¶ 
29, WTO Doc. G/TBT/M/54 (Sept. 20, 2011) [hereinafter TBT Committee June 2011] (“Austral-
ia noted that tobacco packaging was, simply put, one of the last remaining forms of tobacco 
advertising in Australia and plain packaging legislation was therefore the next logical step in 
Australia’s tobacco control efforts.”). 
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a) young adult smokers associate cigarette brand names and 
package designs with positive personal characteristics, social 
identity and aspirations;
b) packaging can create misperceptions about the relative 
strengths, level of tar and health risk of tobacco products;
c) decreasing the number of design elements on a cigarette 
pack reduces its appeal and perceptions about the likely en-
joyment and desirability of smoking; and,
d) plain packaging increases the impact of health warnings.115
After the official implementation of the TPPA in September 
2012, the CCAC conducted a second study during the Act’s rollout 
period; the organization released a report on its findings in July of 
2013.116 The comprehensive study included population surveys of 
attitudes and behaviors relating to smoking, and found that “com-
pared with smokers smoking from branded packs, smokers who 
were smoking from the new plain packs were more likely to perceive 
their tobacco as being lower in quality and tended to be lower in 
satisfaction, were more likely to think about and prioritize quitting, 
and more likely to support the plain packaging policy.”117
Moreover, while Australia is the first nation to successfully im-
plement plain packaging,118 the WHO FCTC issued guidelines in 
2008 recommending its parties to consider the introduction of plain 
packaging.119 Moreover, the parties to the WHO FCTC have agreed 
that health measures for tobacco control are crucial to establishing 
national health policies to protect their populations.120 As mentioned, 
the Panel in US Clove Cigarettes took into account the WHO 
FCTC’s guidelines recommending its parties to regulate flavored 
115. Id.
116. Melanie Wakefield et al., Introduction Effects of the Australian Plain Packaging Policy 
on Adult Smokers: A Cross-sectional Study, BMJ OPEN (2013), 
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/3/7/e003175.full.
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. at 1.
119. TBT Committee June 2011, supra note 112, ¶ 27. There are 180 states that have 
joined the WTO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, including both Australia and 
Ukraine. See Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL,
http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/ (last updated Feb. 12, 2015). However, at the 
TBT Committee, Ukraine argued that Australia’s plain packaging measure could not be justi-
fied under the WHO FCTC because the plain packaging requirements went far beyond the 
obligations set out within the WHO FCTC. See TBT Committee June 2011, supra note 112, ¶ 
13.
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tobacco.121 Thus, the panel reviewing the Australia TPPA dispute 
will almost certainly take the WHO FCTC’s recommendations into 
consideration, along with any relevant evidence, to determine that 
the plain packaging measure highly contributes to the legitimate 
objective of protecting public health.
As to the second factor of the “Necessary” test, even if the ad-
judicating panel finds that the TPPA is highly trade-restrictive, stand-
ing alone, that determination will not be dispositive. For example, in 
US Tuna II, the panel held that the “dolphin-safe” labeling scheme 
was trade-restrictive because it structurally prevented Mexican fish-
eries from gaining access to the label, thus altering the market in the 
United States’ favor.122 Similarly, in US COOL, the panel found that 
the United States’ labeling requirements for meat produced by im-
ported cattle and hogs was trade-restrictive, as it altered the market 
by incentivizing domestic retailers to purchase domestic cattle and 
hogs so they could avoid the labeling hassle altogether.123 Yet, in 
both cases, the Appellate Body held that the respective regulations 
did not violate Article 2.2 of the TBT. While the analysis from US
Tuna II is arguably more applicable to the current case than US
COOL, the latter case demonstrates a valuable point: despite the 
Appellate Body’s suspicions that the measure could have been 
found inconsistent with Article 2.2 if the Appellate Body would have 
had the appropriate evidence in front of it, the Appellate Body ulti-
mately upheld the regulation. This illustrates the Appellate Body’s 
willingness to give great deference to domestic regulations where 
they are in furtherance of a legitimate social concern.
In US Tuna II, the Appellate Body upheld the measure after 
finding that Mexico failed to propose an alternative that would con-
tribute to achieving the legitimate objective of dolphin protection, 
considering the risks at issue and the consequences of nonfulfill-
ment. In other words, Mexico’s proposed alternative would not cre-
ate the same incentive to implement dolphin-safe fishing practices, 
and the result (more dead or seriously injured dolphins) was gauged 
to be very undesirable.124 But in US COOL, the analysis suggests 
that the regulation may have been found inconsistent with Article 2.2 
121. See US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.413 and accompanying 
text. 
122. US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 160.
123. US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 287, 348. 
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had the Appellate Body been able to adduce the appropriate evi-
dence (including that of a proposed alternative) because the current 
labels were complicated and confusing. Therefore, because con-
sumers probably did not understand or value the majority of the in-
formation on the label (because they did not understand it), the 
consequence that would arise from implementing an alternative that 
failed to fulfill the objective (to provide the consumer with certain 
information about their meat products), would be minimal at best.125
However, the Appellate Body determined that, in the absence of a 
proposed viable alternative, a little information is better than no in-
formation at all. Thus, it refused to strike down the regulation under 
Article 2.2.126 This reaffirms the idea that trade-restrictiveness is not 
itself a violation of TBT, as the agreement gives weight to social 
regulations in pursuit of legitimate objectives. Under TBT Article 2.1, 
trade-restrictiveness is a violation where it is not applied even-
handedly (de jure or de facto discrimination); but under TBT Article 
2.2, trade restrictiveness is measured as it relates to contribution to 
the legitimate objective and the risk of nonfulfillment.
Furthermore, as solidified by the TBT jurisprudence, Ukraine 
will need to show a viable alternative in order to have any shot at 
success. In US Clove Cigarettes, the Panel upheld the United 
States’ outright ban on clove cigarettes, after conceding that the 
proposed alternatives (including “placing strict requirements on 
packaging”127 and “requiring health warnings”128) proposed by Indo-
nesia would be “less trade-restrictive.”129 Following this line of rea-
soning, Australia might argue that, in the instant TPPA dispute, the 
plain packaging requirements and required health warnings are cer-
tainly “less trade-restrictive” than the ban in US Clove Cigarettes.
But because the ban in US Clove Cigarettes applied only to flavored 
cigarettes, not all tobacco, there is no guarantee that the adjudicat-
ing panel in the TPPA dispute will find such logic convincing. In oth-
er words, an outright ban on one category of cigarettes might be 
considered more trade-restrictive than placing strict packaging re-
quirements on that one category, but less trade-restrictive than strict 
packaging regulations that apply to all categories of tobacco.
125. US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 476, 478-79. 
126. Id. ¶¶ 479, 491.
127. US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.422.
128. Id.
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Ukraine (or any complainant) might contend, inter alia, that Aus-
tralia could have adopted a less strict packaging requirement that 
would allow trademarks to appear on the packaging. For example, at 
the TBT Committee, Chile expressed concerns with the plain pack-
aging aspect of the TPPA, suggesting that Australia could achieve 
the same objective through the use of “better, newer information in 
visible health warnings without affecting the legitimate use of the 
brand names to differentiate between manufacturers.”130 However, 
even if this question is answered in the affirmative, it is not disposi-
tive of the analysis. First, as the Appellate Body emphasized in US 
Tuna II,131 US Clove Cigarettes,132 and US COOL,133 the complain-
ing party bears the burden of proof to show sufficient evidence that 
such a proposed alternative would make an equivalent contribution 
to the objective. However, it is important to note that, in this case, 
tobacco packaging is one of the last remaining sources of tobacco 
advertising left in Australia.134 Thus, Australia will certainly have the 
opportunity to argue, as the United States did in US Clove Ciga-
rettes, that there are other measures in place that have failed to 
achieve Australia’s legitimate objective of protecting public health.135
For example, several Australian territories have already implement-
ed a requirement for graphic health warnings on cigarette packs.136
While Australia may argue that these previously enacted regula-
tions fail to contribute to the achievement of protecting public health, 
a complaining party might point to available research studies in an 
effort to refute Australia’s contention. For example, one research 
study shows an overall decrease of smoking in Australia from 2001 
to 2011-2012.137 Thus, a complaining party may argue that since 
130. TBT Committee June 2011, supra note 112, ¶ 10.
131. See US Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 28, ¶ 330 (noting that Mexico’s 
proposed alternative would not contribute to the objective of protecting dolphins to the same 
degree as the United States’ current measure).
132. US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.423 (the Panel stated that “the 
mere listing of two dozen alternative measures without more does not show that such 
measures would make an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective”).
133. US COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 27, ¶ 469 (upholding the trade-
restrictive COOL measure in the absence of sufficient evidence for a proposed alternative). 
134. See TBT Committee June 2011, supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
135. See generally Tobacco in Australia: Advertising—State and Territory Legislation, THE 
CANCER COUNCIL, http://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/11-4-state-and-territory-legislation (last 
updated May 2015). 
136. Id. New South Wales, South Australia, and Tasmania have previously enacted to-
bacco regulations requiring tobacco products and displays to display graphic health warnings. 
137. 4125.0 Gender Indicators, Australia, Jan 2013, Smoking, Key Series, AUSTL. BUREAU 
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smoking rates are steadily declining, Australia’s previous methods of 
tobacco regulation are already working to protect public health, and 
therefore a more trade-restrictive measure is not necessary. How-
ever, as the Appellate Body has emphasized, a member has the 
right “to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the 
objective pursued.”138 Therefore, even if smoking rates are shown to 
have decreased by 5% for females and 7% for males since 2001,139
Australia may still argue that it seeks a greater level of protection to 
public health than the prior regulations could afford. And finally, the 
adjudicating panel must consider the serious risks to public health 
that are at issue here, and the consequences that nonfulfillment will 
create (e.g., continued disease and death among Australia’s smok-
ing population). This last deliberation will serve to buttress Austral-
ia’s contention that the TPPA is necessary to achieve Australia’s 
desired level of protection of public health.
CONCLUSION
The trio of cases decided under TBT Article 2.2 reveals that 
dispute resolution in the context of multilateral trading mandates a 
careful consideration of social and regulatory concerns, and affirms 
that there is a positive right to regulation. Effective balancing of free-
trade and social concerns is imperative for trade facilitation in an 
ever-innovating era of increasing economic interdependency. Where 
individuals, private and public institutions, and governments must 
interact with and depend on one another in order to thrive, some 
disputes are inevitable. However, the WTO must maintain its reputa-
tion of legitimacy in the eyes of all stakeholders, so as to avoid the 
same fate as the old GATT.140 While some may argue that the pen-
dulum has swung too far in a reactionary fashion, this Note suggests 
that equilibrium is closer to actualization than ever before. To that 
end, it is argued that the most fundamental concern underlying free-
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4125.0main+features3320Jan%202013 
[hereinafter AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS]. Between 2001 and 2011-12, overall rates of smok-
ing have decreased for both males and females. The age standardized rate of current smok-
ers for males aged 18 years and over fell from 27% in 2001 to 20% in 2011-12, and declined 
from 21% in 2001 to 16% for females.
138. US Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 7.370 and accompanying text. 
139. AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
140. See Cho, supra note 2, at 673 (citing Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-
310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.76, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (Jan. 27, 2000). “The global 
trading system is ‘composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic 
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trade—efficiency141—will be better achieved by a global trading sys-
tem that does not minimize the legitimate social concerns of its par-
ticipants, as this will facilitate trust, thereby incentivizing 
participation. Additionally, where the delicate balance between free 
markets and social regulation is achieved, long-term efficiency can 
be promulgated by stability and predictability.142 Arguably, efficiency 
is best served by the WTO’s use of already existing built-in legisla-
tive enactments, like the TBT, rather than starting anew in entirely 
uncharted territory.143
141. See id. at 626 (noting that free markets are driven by the principle of efficiency). 
142. See id.
143. WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2012, TRADE AND PUBLIC POLICIES: A
CLOSER LOOK AT NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012),
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf.
